advanced

Threat Model: Payment System

High-integrity payment intents, provider calls, webhooks, ledger and reconciliation.

webhookUser / BrowserExternal ProviderPublic APIBackendDatabase
UserLLMAgentToolDataDecisionHumanGuardrail

Assets

Money movementhighly-sensitive

Loss of money movement harms users and the system’s core promise.

Ledger integrityconfidential

Loss of ledger integrity harms users and the system’s core promise.

Provider credentialsconfidential

Loss of provider credentials harms users and the system’s core promise.

Actors and capabilities

ActorTrustStarting capability
Anonymous visitoruntrustedCan send arbitrary public requests.
Authenticated usersemi-trustedCan exercise product APIs within an account or tenant.
Backend servicetrustedCan read and modify scoped production data.
AdministratorprivilegedCan perform exceptional cross-user operations.

Entry points & trust boundaries

Attack surface
public Public API and login

Rate-limit, parse and authenticate at the first boundary.

authenticated Product resources

Every object needs a resource-level authorization decision.

privileged Admin operations

Step-up, separate authorization and audit.

public Webhook

Verify exact provider, body freshness and event identity.

Boundary validation
Browser ┃ TRUST ┃ API
origin where relevant · session/token · shape and limits
API ┃ TRUST ┃ Backend
principal · action · resource authorization
Backend ┃ TRUST ┃ Database
restricted role · tenant scope

Threats

Information DisclosureReplay or duplicate processingOpen lesson →

A valid payment or webhook is processed twice.

IMPACT · Compromise of money movement.
PREVENT · Enforce the boundary-specific control. Limit the responsible identity.
DETECT · Record principal, action and resource.
TamperingPrivilege misuseOpen lesson →

A general application identity can issue refunds.

IMPACT · Compromise of ledger integrity.
PREVENT · Enforce the boundary-specific control. Limit the responsible identity.
DETECT · Record principal, action and resource.
Information DisclosureReconciliation gapOpen lesson →

Provider and internal state diverge without detection.

IMPACT · Compromise of provider credentials.
PREVENT · Enforce the boundary-specific control. Limit the responsible identity.
DETECT · Record principal, action and resource.

Residual risk & unknowns

Residual risks
  • • Privileged insiders and control-plane compromise remain high-impact.
  • • Business abuse can use technically valid operations.
Explicitly out of scope
  • • Physical facilities and provider-internal controls.